Non-interference is a high-level security property that guarantees the absence of illicit information leakages through a program execution. A common means to enforce non-interference is to use an information flow type system. However, such type systems are inherently imprecise, and reject many secure programs, even for simple programming languages. The purpose of this paper is to propose a logical formulation of non-interference that allows a more precise analysis or programs, and that is amenable to deductive verification techniques, such as programming logics and weakest precondition calculi, and algorithmic verification techniques such as modelchecking.
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Non-interference [17] is a high-level security property that characterizes programs whose execution does not reveal information about secret data. More precisely, non-interference for a program assumes a separation between secret inputs and public inputs on the one hand, and secret outputs and public outputs on the other hand, and requires that the value of public outputs does not depend on the value of secret inputs; thus, if we restrict (for the time being) our attention to a simple imperative language as in [41] and write P ( y, x) for a program with secret inputs y and public inputs x and P ( y, x) ⇓ ( y ′ , x ′ ) to denote that on secret inputs y and public inputs x, the program P returns as secret outputs y ′ and public outputs x ′ , non-interference may be cast as:
(Our definition corresponds to termination-insensitive non-interference, and it is only meaningful for deterministic programs.) Type systems provide a standard means of guaranteeing properties of programs; in particular, information flow type systems have been used to guarantee non-interference in a variety of contexts, see e.g. [1, 3, 6, 18, 40, 31, 42] and more particularly [34] for a recent survey of the field. While information flow type systems provide an attractive means to enforce noninterference, they often turn out to be overly conservative in practice. Indeed, many secure programs are rejected by information flow type systems. As illustrated by Joshi and Leino [23] , this phenomenon already arises in the context of simple programming languages: take for example the program x:=y; y:=0 where y is the secret variable not to be revealed, and x is the public variable which can be observed by the attacker: upon execution of the program, the final value of x is 0, hence the attacker will not be able to guess the value of y. Yet such a program is rejected by a typical information flow type system [41, 40] , on the ground that one program fragment taken in isolation is insecure. One remedy to this particular problem is to adopt a controlflow sensitive analysis [10] . However, information flow type systems and static analyses for non-interference are inherently imprecise, and reject too many secure programs for being widely used in practice. The situation is even further aggravated if the programming language includes some features that are notoriously difficult to handle precisely with type systems, such as aliasing or concurrency [37] .
General-purpose logics such as Hoare logics or temporal logics provide a standard means to specify and verify functional and/or behavioral properties of programs. While such logics have been extensively used to verify functional properties of programs, there is a relative lack of experience in using such logics for specifying security properties, see Section 10.5. The objective of this work is to provide characterizations of non-interference in Hoare and temporal logics, so as to enable the use of existing general-purpose verification tools for non-interference. Our characterizations are based on two observations: i) non-interference can be reduced to a property about a single program execution (universally quantified over all possible program inputs), provided an "independent composition" operator ⊲ can be defined within the language; ii) Hoare logics and temporal logics are sound and often complete w.r.t. the programming language operational semantics.
In order to illustrate the ideas behind our characterizations, let us take as a starting point terminationinsensitive non-interference, as defined above, in the setting of the simple programming language of [41] . For such a language, one can define an "independent composition" operator ⊲ (in this case it is simply sequential composition), such that for any two programs P and P ′ , and disjoint variables x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , we have x 
where ⊎ denotes the disjoint union of two memories. This equivalence allows us to recast non-interference as follows:
Next, we can use programming logics, which are sound and (relative) complete w.r.t. the operational semantic, to provide an alternative characterization of noninterference (where x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 are disjoint):
The above characterization of non-interference provides us with a means to resort to existing verification tools to prove, or disprove, non-interference of a program.
Let us return to the program x:=y; x:=0. If we instantiate the above characterizations, we obtain that the program is non-interferent iff for all initial values of x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 :
x 1 := y 1 ; x 1 := 0; x 2 := y 2 ;
or equivalently: {x 1 = x 2 } x 1 := y 1 ; x 1 := 0; x 2 := y 2 ; x 2 := 0 {x 1 = x 2 } which is easy to establish, using the rules of Hoare logics or a weakest precondition calculus.
The above characterization may be extended in several directions: first, it can be extended to any programming language that features an appropriate notion of "independent composition" operator, and that is equipped with an appropriate logic. We illustrate this point by considering a programming language with shared mutable data structures, and by using separation logic [32, 21] to provide a characterization of noninterference (see Section 7). Second, it can be extended to arbitrary relations between inputs and between outputs. Given a program P ( x) and two relations I and I ′ , one can define (I, I ′ )-non-interference (or (I, I ′ )-security-we consider both expressions synonyms) as:
(Note that the distinction between public and secret variables is no longer necessary since it is encoded in I and I ′ .) This more general form of non-interference is useful for providing a characterization of some controlled forms of declassification, such as delimited information release, a form of declassification recently introduced by Sabelfeld and Myers [35] .
While Hoare logics are adequate for characterizing termination insensitive notions of non-interference in a deterministic setting, we use temporal logic to characterize termination-sensitive non-interference for sequential languages and possibilistic non-interference for non-deterministic languages.
In summary, the main contribution of this paper is a detailed study of several logical frameworks for characterizing non-interference, both for sequential and concurrent non-deterministic programming languages.
Our work extends and systematizes previous characterizations or criteria for non-interference based on general purpose logics, see Subsection 10.5, and allows us to conclude that such logics can be used in an appropriate fashion to provide a criterion for, or even to characterize non-interference (in the course of the paper, we pay special attention to the benefits of completeness, see in particular Subsection 10.1). Another minor contribution of our work is to provide methods to establish non-interference for languages for which no information flow type system is known, see in particular Section 7.
Preliminaries
A transition system is a directed graph (Conf, ) where Conf is a set of configurations and ⊆ Conf × Conf is the transition relation. We denote c c ′ for (c, c ′ ) ∈ and c if there is no c ′ ∈ Conf such that c c ′ . Let * denote the reflexive and transitive closure of .
Let Lang be the set of all possible programs specifiable in a given programming (or specification) language, and let it range on S, S ′ , S 1 , etc. Let √ ∈ Lang be a distinguished term indicating successful termination. Let Var be the set of variables which may appear in any program; let it range on x, x ′ , x 1 , y, z, etc. A memory is an object µ that stores a snapshot of all information manipulated by a program in a particular instant, such as variables or heaps. Let M be the set of all memories. We suppose that all information stored in µ can only be accessed throughout variables. Let var(µ) denote the set of all variables whose value is stored in µ. Let V be the set of values of the language under discussion. Function v : (M × Var) → V returns the value that variable x represents in memory µ. (For instance, if x is a pointer to a list, v(x, µ) may return the list represented by this pointer rather than its actual memory address value.)
A key issue along this article is the ability of separate a memory in two disjoint pieces of memories. Let
Notice that ⊕ is commutative. We also assume that every variable x can be assigned a given value d in a memory µ. We denote such operation by
Example 1. Suppose a language which only manipulates integers, i.e. V = Z. Then M is the set of all functions µ : Var → Z with var(µ) = dom(µ), v(µ, x) = µ(x), ⊕ is the disjoint union of functions, and
A configuration represents a particular state in the execution of a program. Formally, Conf = Lang × M is the set of all configurations. In particular, ( √ , µ) indicates that the execution of a program has terminated with memory µ. We assume, hence, that Lang can be given an operational semantics in terms of a transition system (Conf, ) where, for all µ ∈ M, ( √ , µ) .
Example 2. The Par language is defined by
where e is an arithmetic expression and b, b 0 , . . . , b n are boolean expressions. The transition relation of Par is defined by the following rules (we omit symmetric rules for S 1 || S 2 ), where memories are the functions of Example 1.
Notice that our definition of operational semantics admits non-determinism. (Recall that a transition system is deterministic if whenever c c 1 and c c 2 then c 1 = c 2 .) In fact, (x := 0 || x := 1, µ) has two possible outgoing transitions.
A configuration (S, µ) does not terminate, denoted by (S, µ)⊥, if S does not terminate when the memory is µ (either because of an infinite execution or an abnormal stop as, e.g., deadlock), that is, ¬∃µ
Let var(S) be the set of all variable names of S, i.e., the set of all variables appearing in the text of S.
(Notice the overloading with var(µ) for memories). If y / ∈ var(S), define S[y/x] to be the same program as S where all (free) occurrences of variable x are changed by variable y.
In the following, we state a set of basic assumptions about the operational semantics of language Lang. They impose some minimal restrictions. Assumptions 1 and 3 are seemingly obvious and satisfied by most of the languages (if not all). Nonetheless we need to make them explicit to set the ground of our general framework. Assumption 2 rules out some behaviour where memories are objects more complex than functions. Along the article we develop under these assumptions. Assumption 1. Transitions preserve the set of variables of a program. Moreover they do not affect the values of other variables than those appearing in the program.
Notice that this assumption is not contradictory with object creation: a new object may be created but it can only be (directly or indirectly) referred through some variable in the text of the program. Assumption 2. Apart from its syntax, the semantics of a program depends only on the value of its own variables. Moreover, given a memory, it is always possible to find another one with the same values that can be separated in two parts, one of which contains exactly all information relevant to the program. (See Fact 1.6.) Assumption 2 imposes some restrictions on the memory manipulation. For example, if x is a pointer to a list and v(x, µ) is considered to be the list represented by this pointer (rather than its actual address value), the address value cannot affect the control flow of a program. That is, for pointer variables x and y, This assumption allows to change variable names without altering the program behaviour.
The following facts are consequences of the assumptions.
Fact 1 (After assumptions).
1. If var(S) = var(µ 1 ) and (S, µ 1 ⊕µ 2 ) * (S ′ , µ ′ ) then there exists µ Let φ : Var → Var be a partial injective function. φ is intended to relate variables of two programs. Let dom(φ) = {x 1 , . . . , x n } 1 and let I ⊆ V n × V n be a binary relation on tuples of values intended to determine the indistinguishability criterion. We say that memory µ is (φ, I)- The next proposition follows from definition of ∼.
Unless otherwise specified, from now on and until the end of the section, we fix programs S 1 and S 2 , functions φ, φ ′ : var(S 1 ) → var(S 2 ), and relations I and I ′ which define relations ∼ I φ and ∼
id,I2 S.
1 We suppose variables can always be arranged in a particular order which we use to arrange set of variables in tuples.
(From now on, we write (µ,
A program is (TS or TI) (I 1 , I 2 )-secure if, when it starts in states indistinguishable by I 1 , it ends in states indistinguishable by I 2 . Indistinguishability in I 2 for TI security is only conditioned to termination.
This definition allows to encode properties to asses secure information flow. A well-known of such properties is non-interference. A program S is non-interfering if, when it starts in any of two memories which are indistinguishable for an attacker in the public variables L, the execution of this two runs ends in memories which are also indistinguishable on L. Therefore S is TS (resp. TI) non-interfering if it is TS (resp.
. It is not difficult to check that these definitions agree with those already defined in the literature (e.g. [17, 41, 37, 23] ).
The generality of our definition is useful for providing a characterisation of some forms of controlled declassification. Declassification allows to leak some confidential information without being too revealing. A typical example is a program S that informs the average salary of the employee of a company without revealing any other information that may give any further indications of particular salaries (which is confidential information). Suppose employee salaries are stored in the list lsalaries and the average will be stored in a l . S should be (A, = {a l } )-secure to ensure that no other information of the salary than the average is revealed. (See Example 3 for the definition of A.) A semantic characterisation of this kind of properties has recently been given in [35] and coined delimited release.
Checking Information Flow throughout Variable Renaming
Let ⊲ be an operation in Lang such that, for all
. It is not difficult to check that sequential composition and parallel composition in language Par satisfy conditions of ⊲.
Operation ⊲ is the first of the two ingredients on which our result builds up. Notice that non-interference, as given in Definition 1, considers separately an execution of program S 1 and another of S 2 . By composing S 1 ⊲ S 2 , properties (a) and (b) above allows to put these executions one after the other. Therefore we can find a different characterisation of security: Definition 2. Let S 1 and S 2 be two programs such that var(
The proof of the next theorem can be found in Appendix B.
The second ingredient is variable renaming. Notice that programs sharing variable names fall out of Definition 2 (and Theorem 1). With the help of variable renaming this is not longer an obstacle, but for this we need to know that renaming preserves non-interference. This is established in the following theorem which proof can be found in Appendix C.
where S 2 [ξ] is program S 2 whose variables has been renamed according to function ξ.
Putting together Theorems 1 and 2 we have the following corollary:
′ for all x ∈ var(S). Then, the following statements are equivalent. But this is what verification logic are used to. After revisiting Definition 2 in a deterministic setting, we characterise (I 1 , I 2 )-security in some such logics.
S is TS (resp. TI)
Finally, notice that ξ must rename all variables to fresh names. To see this, take program S ≡ x l := y h ; y h := x l with x l public and y h private. S is interfering, i.e., it is not (= {x l }, , = {x l } )-secure. Never-
Deterministic Programs
Simpler definitions for non interference can be obtained if the program S under study is deterministic as stated by the following theorem.
be a deterministic program (and hence also is S), and let ξ as in Corollary 1.
S is TS
The simplicity of definitions in Theorem 3 w.r.t. Definition 2 lies in the fact that the operational behaviour is only on one side of the implication and does not make reference to intermediate points in the program. The proof of Theorem 3 can be found in Appendix D.
Recall that memories defined in Example 1 are simple functions. In this case, every memory µ can be separated in two pieces µ 1 and µ 2 s.t. µ = µ 1 ⊕µ 2 . Hence, we do not need to be selective on the shape of the memories, and definitions on Theorem 3 can be further simplified. The following corollary is a consequence of this observation.
Corollary 2. Let S ⊲ S[ξ]
be a deterministic program with memory as defined in Example 1. Let ξ as in Corollary 1. 1. S is TS (I 1 , I 2 )-secure if and only if
Hoare logic
Let While be the subset of Par not containing parallel composition and limiting the if construction to be binary and deterministic:
Recall that memories are the functions of Example 1.
Let P and Q be first order predicate and S a While program. Recall that a Hoare triple [20] {P } S {Q} means that whenever S starts to execute in a state in which P holds, if it terminates, it does so in a state satisfying Q. An assertion {P } S {Q} holds if it is provable with the following rules:
Hoare logic is sound and (relatively) complete w.r.t. operational semantics [12] . That is, for all program S and predicates P and Q, {P } S {Q} is provable iff for all µ, µ ′ , µ |= P and (S, µ) * ( √ , µ ′ ) imply µ |= Q. µ |= P means that P holds whenever every program variable x appearing in P is replaced by the value µ(x).
Suppose I(I) is a predicate such that
where
., x n }. We expect that I(I) is definable in the specification logic embedded in the Hoare logic. For instance, predicate
(which is the renaming version of ∼ = id L in Example 3), can be defined by x∈L x = x ′ . Termination insensitive (I 1 , I 2 )-security can be characterised in Hoare logic as follows: S is TI (I 1 , I 2 )-secure iff {I(I 1 )} S ; S[ξ] {I(I 2 )} is provable. This is shown in the following:
Example 4. Let x l and y h be respectively a public and a confidential variable in the program x l := x l + y h ; x l := x l − y h . We show that it is noninterfering. Indistinguishability in this case is characterised by predicate
. the proof is given in the left side of Figure 1 .
Another example -the PIN control access-deals with declassification. In program if (in = pin) then acc := true else acc := false fi Figure 1 . Security proof in Hoare logic variable pin, which stores the actual PIN number, is suppose to be confidential. in, containing the attempted number, is a public input variable and acc, conceding or not the access to the system, is a public output variable. The declassified information only should reveal whether the input number (in) agrees with the PIN number (pin) or not, and such information is revealed by granting the access or not (indicated in acc). We, therefore, require that the program 
Separation Logic
Separation logic is an extension of Hoare logic to reason about shared mutable data structures [32, 21] . While p extends the While language with the following commands:
where i ∈ {1, 2} and e is a pure expression (not containing a dot or cons). x := cons(e 1 , e 2 ) creates a cell in the heap where the tuple (e 1 , e 2 ) is stored, and allows x to point to that cell. e.i returns the value of the ith position of the tuple pointed by i. (Binary tuples suffices for our purposes though arbitrary n-tuples appeared in the literature and can also be considered here.) Then, x := e.i and x.i := e allow to read and update the heap respectively. Values in While p may be integers or locations (including nil).
A memory contains two components: a store, mapping variables into values, and a heap, mapping locations (or addresses) into values. Thus, if V = Z ∪ Loc, S = Var → V is the set of stores and H = Loc−{nil} → (V ×V) is the set of heaps. Hence M = S ×H. As a consequence variables can have type Z or type Loc.
Separation logic requires additional predicates to manipulate pointers. In addition to formulas of the classical predicate calculus, the logic has the following forms of assertions: e → (e 1 , e 2 ) that holds in a singleton heap with location satisfying e and the cell values satisfying e 1 and e 2 respectively; empty that holds if the heap is empty; and P * Q, named separating conjunction, holds if the heap can be split in two parts, one satisfying P and the other Q. There exists a calculus for these operations including the separating implication P − * Q (see [32, 21] ). The meaning of an assertion depends upon both the store and the heap:
Separation logic extends Hoare logic with the following rules. The so-called frame rule, that allows to extend local specification, is given by
where no variable occurring free in R is modified by S. The (local version) rules for heap manipulation commands are the following (we omit symmetric rules):
) and e ′ is not free in e", then {e → ( , e2)} e.i := e1 {e → (e1, e2)} If x does not occur in e1 or in e2 then
′ and x ′′ are different and x does not occur in e, then
Using separation logic we can defined inductive predicates to make reference to structures in the heap (see [32, 21] ). For example, predicate list is defined by:
Our result in separation logic applies to predicates like this. For the sake of simplicity, we restrict to lists.
As we mentioned, a memory is a tuple containing a store and a heap. We need to define var, v, and ⊕ in this domain. Therefore, for all s, s 1 , s 2 ∈ S, h, h 1 , h 2 ∈ H, and x ∈ Var, we define var(s, h) = dom(s),
, where reach(loc, h) = n≥0 h n (loc) − {nil} is the set of locations reachable form the set loc. If this restriction does not hold, then, for x ∈ var(s 1 , h 1 ), v((s 1 ⊕s 2 , h 1 ⊕h 2 ), x) may be defined when v((s 1 , h 1 ), x) is not (hence not satisfying the requirement of ⊕ in Section 2).
Notice 
where we suppose the existence of I v such that
where v(µ, y) is defined as in Section 6, and ds and ds ′ are actual list values.
) I sl (I) has two parts: the first part states the separation of the heap, the second one, the indistinguishability of the values. We prove in the following that I sl (I), characterises indistinguishability in a separable memory, i.e., a memory µ such that ∃µ 1 , µ 2 : µ = µ 1 ⊕µ 2 with var(µ 1 ) = var(S) and var(µ 2 ) = var(S)
′ . First, notice that v(h, l) is defined and l = nil iff reach({l}, h)
We finally prove the correctness of I sl (I):
′ , I) iff {Def. of Iv and equality on vectors} ∃ xs, xs
Separation logic is (relatively) complete for the sublanguage we are using [21] (recall that it restricts to use the dot and cons only in the specific assignments in (1)). As a consequence, security in separation logic can be completely characterised as follows: S is TI (
} is provable. This can be proven like for Hoare logic using Theorem 3 instead of Corollary 2, and the characterisation of I sl (I) above. The details are reported in Appendix E.
Example 5. The following program receives a list lsalaries with employees salaries and returns in a l the average of the salaries.
p := lsalaries ; s := 0 ; n := 0 ; while p = nil do n := n + 1 ; saux := p.salary ; s := s + saux ; paux := p.next ; p := paux ; od a l := s/n Variables s aux and p aux are specially included to meet the syntax restrictions imposed to the language. Call this program AV SAL (for "AVeragre SALary").
The security requirement have been discussed at the end of Section 3: we would like it to be (A, = {a l } )-secure. Thus, precondition I sl (A) and postcondition I sl (= {a l } ) are respectively the following predicates: A complete proof can be found in Appendix H.
Notice that the language for mutable data structure we use does not allow to manipulate pointer arithmetics nor to test on pointer values. In fact, the characterisation of security in separation logic as given above, only observes the values that pointers represent, not their actual address values. This is similar to Banerjee and Naumann's approach to non-interference in an object based setting [3] . If tests on pointers are allowed, this approach lets leak information throughout address values. An example of such leak is program if y h = 0 then p l := q l else p l := cons(q l .1, q l .2) fi with y h being the only private variable. At the end of the program, p l and q l agree on the value they represent, though if y h = 0 they will point to the same place; otherwise they will not. We do not discard however a stronger characterisation of security that control (some) leakage through addresses.
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
LTL [25] is a temporal logic that extends propositional logic allowing to express properties along a single program execution, i.e. a (maximal) sequence of transitions. Apart from the usual propositional operations (atomic propositions, ¬, ∨, ∧, →,. . . ), LTL provides (unary) temporal operators F and G. Fφ (read "finally φ") holds in a program execution if φ holds in some suffix of this execution. Gφ (read "globally φ") holds in a program execution if φ holds in all suffixes of this execution. LTL includes other (more expressive) operators which are not of relevance in this article.
Formally, a transition system (Conf, ) is extended with a function Prop that to each configuration in Conf assigns a set of atomic propositions. Prop(c) is the set of all atomic propositions valid in c. An execution is a maximal (finite or infinite) sequence of configurations ρ = c 0 c 1 c 2 . . . such that c i c i+1 and if it ends in a configuration c n then c n .
For an atomic proposition p, ρ |= p iff p ∈ Prop(ρ 0 ). The semantics of the propositional operators ¬, ∧, ∨, → are as usual (e.g., ρ |= φ ∧ ψ iff ρ |= φ and ρ |= ψ). We denote c |= φ iff ∀ρ : ρ 0 = c : ρ |= φ.
We limit our discussion of LTL to deterministic programs though the reader should be aware that this logic is mostly used to specify properties of nondeterministic (reactive) programs. We will argue in the next section why LTL cannot be used for studying non-interference in nondeterministic programs.
Let at[S] be the atomic proposition that indicates that program S is about to be executed, i.e., at 
, that is,"if the initial state is indistinguishable according to I 1 , whenever program S[ξ] is reached (and hence S terminates), the program terminates in a state that is indistinguishable according to I 2 ". We prove the correctness of this characterisation in the following. Before, notice that, restricted to a deterministic setting c |= Gφ iff ∀c
iff {Semantics of LTL and determinism} 
The termination sensitive case can be proven following similar reasoning. The proof is given in Appendix F.
Example 6. Let y h be a confidential variable in program while y h =0 do y h := 0 od. We check non-interference, that is, (=, =)-security. Then Ind(= ∅ ) ≡ true. 
Nondeterminism and CTL
Computation Tree Logic (CTL for short) [11] is a temporal logic that extends propositional logic allowing to express properties on the branching structure of a nondeterministic execution. That is, CTL temporal operators allow to quantify over execution paths that are possible from a given state. In particular, formula EFφ states that exists an execution path that leads to a future state in which φ holds, while AFφ states that all execution paths lead to a future state in which φ holds. Dually, EGφ states that exists an execution path in which φ globally holds (i.e., it holds in every state along this execution), and AGφ says that for all paths φ holds globally. CTL includes other (more expressive) operators which we omit in this discussion. In fact, we only need modalities EF and AG whose formal semantics can be characterised in terms of reachability as follows.
For an atomic proposition p, c |= p iff p ∈ Prop(c). The semantics of the propositional operators ¬, ∧, ∨, → are as usual (e.g., c |= φ ∧ ψ iff c |= φ and c |= ψ). It is known that CTL and LTL are incomparable on expressiveness. AG(φ → EFψ) is a typical CTL formula which is not expressible in LTL. It can be shown that AG(φ → (AGψ ∨ EFψ)) is neither. These formulas occur as nontrivial subformulas of the CTL characterisations of security. As a consequence, security cannot be characterised with LTL in a non-deterministic setting (at least using our technique).
Example 7.
Let y h be a confidential variable in the following programs (borrowed from [23] ):
We check whether they are (possibilistic) noninterfering [37, 23] , that is, whether they are (=, =)-secure. We use CTL and for this we set Ind(= ∅ ) ≡ true. The automata of the (self-composed) programs above are depicted in Figure 3 . (Annotations are like in Example 6.)
Observe that both programs satisfy the TI formula Termination and possibilistic security. Example 7 anticipates certain subtleties arising from termination. It has been argued that program (b) still leaks information [23] . A sharp adversary that can observe possibilistic non-termination may detect that a possible execution of the same instance of a program (i.e. running with the same starting memory) stalls indefinitely. Such adversary can observe a difference between program (b) under y h = 0 (which sometimes terminates and some others does not) or under y h = 1 (which always terminates). To this extend, our characterisation of TS (I 1 , I 2 )-security fails. Along this article we developed under the notion of strict non termination: (S, µ)⊥ states that S does not terminate in µ. A notion of possibilistic termination can be given, denoted by (S, µ)ր, that states that there is an execution of S from memory µ that does not terminate. I.e., (S, µ)ր iff there exists ρ such that (S, µ)=ρ 0 and ∀i : i ≥ 0 :
In addition to this, one of the following termination conditions can be also required:
, and provided that I 1 is symmetric, (i) can be deduced from (o). Since (o) implies (i), and (S, µ)⊥ implies (S, µ)ր, then (ii) is redundant as well.
Condition (iii) states that if a program may not terminate then it must not terminate in any indistinguishable state. As a consequence it considers insecure any program that sometimes terminates and some other which evidently does not reveal any information.
Condition (iv) states that a program that may not terminate in a given state, should be able to reach a non-termination situation in any indistinguishable state. Provided that I 1 is symmetric, this also means that a secure program that surely terminates in a state, surely terminates in any indistinguishable state. This definition rules out Example 7(b) as insecure, but considers (3) to be secure.
The following CTL formulas characterise these restrictions:
where (iv s ) is the restriction of (iv) to the case in which I 1 is symmetric. Notice that (iii) is not satisfied in any automaton of Figure 3 
Discussion
10.1. Benefits of completeness. While our characterization of non-interference with Hoare logics is sound and complete, it is undecidable in general and not obviously compositional. This is to be contrasted with type systems for non-interference, as type inference is usually decidable and the typing rules is compositional.
Completeness of the Hoare logic allows us to achieve the best of the two worlds. Indeed, consider for example the type system of [41] ; it follows immediately from the soundness of their type system and from our characterization of non-interference that the following rule is valid:
Likewise, it follows immediately from the definition of non-interference that rules such as the one below are valid:
Such rules are most useful in order to automate or shorten proofs of non-interference for programs.
Model Checking. Results of Sections 8 and 9
allow to directly use model checker tools such as SPIN [39] or SMV [38] for checking (I 1 , I 2 )-security. However, this is limited to programs with finite state spaces.
To model check infinite state space systems, we will need either to use the assistance of proof checkers, or to resort to abstractions. (I 1 , I 2 )-security already suggests some abstraction in predicates I 1 and I 2 . Depending on the granularity defined by these predicates, abstractions may be complete, or further abstraction may be necessary resulting, in any case, in safe approximations. Since (I 1 , I 2 )-security is a particular kind of CTL or LTL property, we hope that model checking can be specifically tailored to it.
10.3. Other forms of non-interference. One natural direction for further research is to provide similar characterizations for other notions of non-interference. In particular, we intend to study further the appropriateness of our approach for capturing declassification.
Further, we intend to extend our results to account for covert channels. In particular, we expect that our characterizations may be adapted to probabilistic noninterference, a refined notion of non-interference that is adopted in many works on non-deterministic languages, see e.g. [36, 37] , and that eliminates probabilistic covert channels by considering the distribution of the inputs and outputs. It will also be interesting to assess the applicability of probabilistic Hoare logics [14] and probabilistic model-checking [5] in this context. Likewise, we hope that our characterizations may be adapted to account for timing leaks, using appropriate logics for timed systems [19] .
10.4. Extension to Java. Another natural direction for further research is to extend the results of this paper to other language constructs such as exceptions and objects. We are particularly interested in applying our method to Java applets, in particular since security policies for JavaCard applets often require some form of non-interference [9, 26] , and type-based systems such as the ones of [3] seem too restrictive for accepting JavaCard applets as secure (of course, one could resort to JFlow [27] but we are not aware of any non-interference result for this type system).
The extension of our work to Java raises subtle issues, in particular with respect to definability of heap indistinguishability [3] that involves a partial bijection between addresses, and with exceptions that poses problems similar to terminationsensitive non-interference. However, we believe that it is possible to give an appropriate characterization of non-interference in the Java Modeling Language JML [24] , and use existing verification tools such as Jack [8] (see [7] for an overview of JML tools) to validate non-interference. Likewise, we believe that it is possible to use temporal logics to characterize non-interference, and to use model-checking tools to verify that Java programs are non-interferent.
Related work.
A large body of recent works on non-interference follows a type-based approach, see [34] for a recent survey. There are however, notable exceptions to this trend. In particular, many characterizations of non-interference, often amenable to model-checking techniques, have been developed in the context of process algebras, see e.g. [2, 15, 33] . In particular [16] reports on a model checker for SPA [15] , though the approach is based on bisimulation checking rather than verification of temporal properties.
Closest to our concerns is the work of Joshi and Leino [23] , who provide a characterization of non-interference using weakest precondition calculi. Like ours, their characterization can be applied to a variety of programming constructs, including non-deterministic constructs, and can handle termination sensitive non-interference. The nature of wp calculi allows to nicely relate wp predicates through predicate formula. Hence, in contrast to our approach, they can speak of several execution runs in the same formula (see their definition of cylinder), but, at the same time, this circumscribes the technique to wp calculi rather than allowing the generality of techniques like in our approach.
It is also fair to mention that our encoding of possibilistic security, requires a "check-point" in the middle of the execution with an existential quantification. This limits our approach to logics that can observe branching structure of executions such as CTL, CTL * , or the modal µ-calculus, ruling out other logics usually used to analyse concurrent systems such as LTL or OwickiGries logic.
More recently, Darvas, Hähnle and Sands [13] resort to dynamic logic to provide criteria for (TS and TI) non-interference in the context of JavaCard. They also observe how such a formalization can be generalized to handle some forms of declassification. However, they do not show that their definition characterizes non-interference, nor do they highlight the benefits of completeness. Further, they do not handle nondeterminism.
Independently of this work, Jacobs and Warnier [22] provide a method to verify non-interference for (sequential) Java programs. Their method relies on a relational Hoare logic for JML programs, and is applied to an example involving logging in a cash register. However there lacks a precise analysis of the form of noninterference enforced by their method.
Further afield, there have been a number of works that use Hoare-like or temporal logics, and their associated verification methods, to specify and enforce security properties of programs: e.g. Jensen and his coworkers [4] have employed model-checking techniques to verify control-flow properties of Java programs, whereas Pavlova and co-workers [28] have used weakest precondition calculi to enforce high level security properties of JavaCard applications. However, none of them address the issue of non-interference. Assumption 1. Transitions preserve the set of variables of a program. Moreover they do not affect the values of other variables than those appearing in the program: For all S, S ′ , µ 1 , µ 2 , and µ ′ , if var(S) = var(µ 1 ) and (S, µ 1 ⊕µ 2 ) (S ′ , µ ′ ), then var(S) ⊇ var(S ′ ) and ∃µ
is symmetric and for all (S 1 , µ 1 ), (S 2 , µ 2 ) ∈ R the following properties hold: (a)
Assumption 2. Apart from its syntax, the semantics of a program depends only on the value of its own variables. Moreover, given a memory, it is always possible to find another one with the same values that can be separated in two parts, one of which contains exactly all information relevant to the program: Relation
is a bisimulation. Moreover for every memory µ there are µ 1 , µ 2 such that var(µ 1 ) = var(S) and ∀x : v(µ, x) = v(µ 1 ⊕µ 2 , x) (and hence, (S, µ), (S, µ 1 ⊕µ 2 ) belongs to the relation).
As a consequence of Assumption 2, relation
∧ µ⊕µ1 and µ⊕µ2 are defined } (4) is also a bisimulation. This property means that the behaviour of S is the same regardless the contents of the piece of memory not touched by variables in var(S).
(Notice that bisimulation (4) and the one of Assumption 2 coincides under memories of Example 1.)
Assumption 3. The operational semantics of the language Lang is independent of variable names: Relation 
Finally, since φ : var(S 1 ) → var(S 2 ) and var
by Proposition 1, concluding this part of the proof.
Case (⇐). By Fact 1.6, there is always possible to find equivalent separable memory. So, w.l.o.g., take
By Proposition 1 and Fact 1.2,
φ ′ ,I ′ S 2 is assumed to hold, this implies
for some η ′ 2 . By Proposition 1 and Fact 1.2
which concludes the termination sensitive case. 
Case (i) follows as in case (⇐) of (a). So suppose case (ii) holds. But then (S 2 , η 1 ⊕η 2 )⊥ by Fact 1.3, which concludes the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Let n be number of variables x s.t. ξ(x) = x. Case n = 0 corresponds to the identity and it is proved trivially. The case of n = 1 is proven below. Case n > 1 follows by straightforward induction. y) ], φ(z)), and hence
which proves this case.
and, for all z ∈ dom(φ) = dom([y/x]φ), φ(z) = if (([y/x]φ)(z)=y) then x else φ(z) (and similarly for φ ′ ). Using the previous case,
Case (b). For the case of TI non-interference, we take over from (5) and suppose, instead that ( 
iff {Determinism, Prop. (b) of ⊲ and and Fact 1.2} ∀µ1, µ2, µ
granted by Fact 1.1, and logic} ∀µ, µ ′ :
F. Proof for characterisation of security in LTL -TS case
Notice that on deterministic transition systems, c |= Fφ iff ∃c
iff {Def. of ⊥, logic, and semantics of F} ∀µ :
iff {Semantics of LTL, determinism, and notation}
iff {Satisfaction of at[S[ξ]], Fact 1.1 , and logic} ∀µ1, µ2 :
iff { Semantics of AG and →} ∀µ1, µ2 :
iff {Notation considering that every µ can be separated
H. Proof for Example 5
Recall that the invariant presented for the while do in AV SAL is ∃ps, ps ′ : list.ps ′ .lsalaries ′ * ( list.ps.lsalaries ∧ ∃psmis, psprev : (ps = psprev + + psmis) ∧ list.psmis.p
The intuition behind the invariant is as follows. First, the general indistinguishability invariant has to hold (last line in the equation). Then, it splits the memory in two parts and it basically focus on the "non-primed" part of the memory (the one confined to AV SAL). This part states that the original salary list (represented here by list ps) can be split in two salary lists, ps prev and ps mis . ps prev contains the elemnts that have already been accounted while ps mis contains those still to be accounted. This (partial) accounting of the salaries involve two operations: a summation, which is stored in variable s, and an element counting, which is stored in variable n. In this way, at the end of the loop, p is nil implying that ps mis = [ ] and hence ps prev = ps. Therefore s will be equal the sum of all the salaries and n the length of the original list, i.e. the quantities of summed salaries.
For the verification of {I sl (A)} AV SAL ; AV SAL[ξ] {I sl (= {a l } )} we focus on the second part of the algorithm. The first part basically repeats the same proof, which we left for the interested reader. We only omit some few proof obligations. 
